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Abstract:
Given the export dependent nature of most of British Columbias essentially publicly-owned
resource-based economy, many of its rural communities suffer from peripherality and
exposure to world commodity market fluctuations, exhibiting the classic symptoms of
unsustainable resource exploitation.  Over the past decade, a radical provincial administration
has attempted to address these difficulties, promoting a programme entailing greater efforts to
develop a community-based consensual approach to the planning and management of the
provincial resource base, and a move away from reliance on commercially driven
development strategies.  Our paper considers whether this attempt to create sustainability in
one province has worked, by examining four key elements of the strategy adopted:
participatory strategic land use planning; a more transparent set of forest management
practices; settlement of First Nations land claims along with devolution of the planning and
management of resources in these territories; and the design of a new locally-based
consensual approach towards examination of the case for lifting the moratorium on offshore
oil and gas developments.  We conclude that while a move from the status quo is welcome,
many of the initiatives undertaken by the New Democratic Party during the 1990s failed to
acknowledge the need for new processes of governance rather than simply new policy
instruments.  The result has been an undue reliance on increased regulatory control operating
through a centralised provincial bureaucracy, whereas the more successful of the initiatives
undertaken over this period have operated through the devolution of responsibility for
decision-making down to the local communities affected.
2Export-led Peripherality
British Columbia provides a classic example of export led development.  In 1999, natural
resources accounted for 73% of provincial exports (BC Stats, 2001b).  Input-output analysis
indicates that demand for the output of the integrated forest sector alone (logging, lumber,
value-added, pulp and paper) supported 17% of the provincial GDP in 1996 (BC Stats,
2001c).  This sector accounted for more than half of provincial exports in 1999, and provided
35% of the world market in coniferous lumber.  In 1997, BC was the source for 49% of all
US lumber imports.
An export led, natural resource based, development pathway has in turn generated a core-
periphery pattern of regional communities within the province, mirroring the classic Innis
model of staple production (Innis, 1933).  Harold Innis offered a perceptive early analysis of
the way external markets governed the development of resource staples in Canada, creating
the demand which attracted labour and capital to the resource base, and leaving the resulting
communities with infrastructure and transport networks better tailored to the efficient
delivery of exports than to local needs.  Such a development pathway, Innis observed, led to
weakness in other lines of development, dependence on highly industrialised areas for
markets and for supplies of manufactured goods, and the danger of fluctuations in the staple
commodity (ibid., p.6).
Applying an economic base model, Horne (1999) examined the income dependency of 63
local areas in BC outside the core metropolitan area of Greater Vancouver.  In 1996 49 (78%)
of BC non-metropolitan communities derived more than 10% of their income from the
forestry sector, a proportion slightly up from the previous review undertaken in 1991.  In 17
(27%) of these communities in 1996, income dependence on forestry exceeded 30%.  Figure
1, derived from these results, illustrates the degree to which the non-metropolitan hinterland
of the province is dependent on natural resource based income.
Figure 2, taken from the same source, also confirms another aspect of the Innis model, the
low level of economic diversity common to many of these rural communities, measured in
terms of the degree of concentration of income on a narrow range of basic activities.  Wage
levels in the forestry, energy and mining sectors are well above the provincial average (see
below), but at the same time provincial unemployment rates in goods producing activities,
which are mainly resource based and concentrated in rural communities, are also higher and
more volatile than in services (BC Stats, 2001d).  When export led resource dependency is
combined with lack of diversity, a community is particularly vulnerable to market
fluctuations.  Figure 3 demonstrates the income vulnerability of those communities in BC
regions that rely heavily on forestry.
All this suggests that a large proportion of BCs rural communities can still be considered to
suffer from resource based peripherality.  Although they may be able to offer good wages as
long as export demand is healthy, these communities are badly exposed during economic
downturns, and many have little resilience in coping with sectoral problems affecting their
resource staple.  Lay-offs and redundancies feature heavily during world recessions, and the
economic history of the province has left a legacy of ghost towns.
The economic peripherality of many of these rural communities is further compounded by a
high degree of spatial isolation: three-quarters of BCs 4.1 million population lives in the
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overall provincial population density of 4.3 persons per sq. km. is half that of the Scottish
Highlands and Islands.  Agriculture occupies only 4% of the land base.  Much of the rural
hinterland has a density well below 1 person per sq. km., characterised by small communities
reliant on a single main employer engaged in natural resource extraction and processing,
surrounded by vast areas of largely uninhabited wilderness.
The Search for Sustainability
Sustainable development has been defined as development which improves the peoples
quality of life, within the carrying capacity of the earths life support system (WCU et al,
1991, p.5).  Whether it is ever practicable to deliver the economic, social and environmental
elements of sustainability simultaneously is the subject of continued vigorous debate.  The
belief sustainability is not a zero-sum game and that there need be no trade-off between these
elements pervades the development strategies currently pursued within the European Union,
which apply a paradigm that has been termed ecological modernisation (Jackson & Roberts,
1999).  Hajer (1996) suggests a development pathway for the emergence of the ecological
modernisation discourse itself, from a beginning in institutional learning with policy makers
framing the debate in more appropriate ways, through a belief in technological solutions to
environmental problems, towards an ultimate shift in cultural politics.
At this final stage, ecological modernisation as cultural politics, the agenda chosen by policy-
makers offers the means for a radical cultural realignment in the approach towards
development, switching from top-down strategies towards the advocacy and delivery of
bottom up ones, applying the dictum think globally, act locally.  Various international and
national initiatives to this end have been promoted since the Rio Earth Summit in 1991,
amongst the best known being Local Agenda 21.  However, export-led peripheral
communities such as those depicted as common in rural BC pose a particular challenge in
proving the integrity of the ecological modernisation paradigm as a basis for sustainable
development.
In BC, the core-periphery dependency of such communities is overlain with territorial
governance issues, which have compounded the problem of promoting locally-based,
consensual sustainable development strategies.  As Bennett (1997) observes, a truly-
bounded system of local governance, which has an administrative system that matches its
functional socio-economic space, makes strategic policy-making much easier, because if
territory, economy, society and environmental impact, as well place-consciousness are all
coterminous, spillover, inter-governmental negotiation, partnership etc, all disappear as issues
to be addressed (p.326).
Thanks to Canadas federal constitution, the province as a whole, and its peripheral rural
communities in particular, offer an example of local governance that is as far from Bennetts
truly bounded system as it is possible to envisage.  As is demonstrated later in this paper,
there are overlapping and conjoint jurisdictional issues affecting most major provincial land
use developments, including the pressing question of land claims by First Nations which
remains outstanding from initial colonisation.  The unbounded nature of provincial
governance is further exacerbated in the case of BC by the peculiarities of its system of land
use planning and resource management.  This is designed to cope with what is still almost
wholly a publicly owned land base: 94% of BC is held as Crown Lands, administered
4through the regional offices of a centralised provincial bureaucracy.  Under such
circumstances, the initiatives pursued by provincial policy makers over the past decade to
engender consensual locally based approaches to sustainability amongst its rural communities
serve as a demonstration project of the viability of ecological modernisation under the most
demanding conditions.
Resource Management and Economic Development in Rural BC
Verdoorns Law, which provides the basis for Kaldors model of self-sustaining export led
regional growth (Kaldor, 1970), relies on the presence of scale economies realisable through
manufacturing.  In the case of BC, most manufacturing continues to be resource-based and
therefore subject to the constraints of resource exhaustion and diminishing returns, suggesting
that the Kaldorian thesis has limited utility in this context.  As the provincial government
statistics service observes:
There are obvious natural limits to exports of raw or semi-processed forest products as
annual forest yields approach or exceed sustainable levels.  They may already have reached
those levels, but the value of forestry exports may yet be pushed higher by increasing value-
added content.  That objective is, of course, a constant preoccupation of provincial economic
planners (BC Stats, 2001b, p.2).
However, a slightly earlier report from the same source observes:
Substantial timber resources clearly do not ensure that a province will develop a major
furniture manufacturing industry.  Most of BCs wood resources are not particularly suitable
for furniture manufacture, and the provinces wood industry tradition has been mainly in high
volume products of lumber, with relatively little production of completed goods (BC Stats,
2000b, p.8).
Growth in BCs value-added wood exports lags behind the rest of Canada.  The BC forestry
industry continues to export the bulk of its wood products as semi-processed construction
lumber, pulp, paper or fibre board, produced by integrated rural mills.  Although Hutton
(1997) identifies some decoupling of the core-periphery relationship at the core end thanks to
the realisation of agglomeration economies in the Greater Vancouver area, this diversification
of the metropolitan provincial base has not permeated the rural hinterland.  Indeed, current
indications suggest that the rural periphery is becoming even less diverse and more dependent
on export based earnings (Horne, 1999).
Binkley (1997) uses the exemplar of the forestry sector to list what he terms the predictable
elements of resource depletion as they are likely to manifest themselves in the provinces
dependent peripheral rural communities:
• The initial stage of development, consisting of the harvesting of old growth,
realises pure Ricardian resource rents, the value of stands on the most accessible
land being highest, diminishing the more remote the site.  It can be argued that
little of the BC forestry sector has emerged from this phase as yet.
• As harvesting costs for old growth rise, at some stage it may be profitable to
switch from the extraction to the farming of timber, replacing old growth with a
combination of managed secondary growth and tree plantations.  However, as the
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such a switch will be limited by greater overseas competition in main markets, and
the substitution of alternative materials for timber.
• Ultimately, under a successful transition to a sustainable state, all the sector will
switch to a managed state, in which no timber is harvested outwith sustainable
secondary growth and plantations, a situation reached by a comparable resource-
based economy: New Zealand.  Alternatively, in the absence of appropriate
measures to ease such a transition, the resource based sector will suffer rapid
exhaustion, economic decline and stagnation, with associated environmental
damage.
The above pathway entails what is essentially a substitution of reproducible for
environmental capital.  This substitution can come about purely as the result of market forces
within the sector, or partly in response to conservationist pressures seeking to bring to bear
the non-timber values of old growth forest reserves in the decision-making process.  The
latter has been a feature of recent BC policy development, as our subsequent argument will
reveal.
Nevertheless, even the best managed resource based export led communities contain within
themselves the seeds of their own economic unsustainability, regardless of any associated
social and environmental considerations.  Resource industries such as forestry will only cope
with diminishing factor returns if higher resource extraction costs, affecting sustainably
managed land as well as old growth, are offset by greater productivity, both in logging and in
subsequent processing.  The corollary is a substitution of capital for labour and a reduction in
the industrys employment base.  Binkley quotes a source suggesting that employment per
cubic metre of timber harvested in BC has fallen by a factor of two between 1961 and 1989
(ibid., p.41).
Unless technological innovation can boost returns, or unanticipated boosts to market demand
occur, given a fixed resource base investment in labour saving capital will eventually reduce
the productivity of capital, ensuring that returns to investments in resource based industries
fall relative to those in other sectors.  There is thus a limit on the extent to which capital can
substitute for labour, and it follows that there is also a limit on the duration of associated high
wage rates in the sector (Hallin, 2000, indicates that 1999 weekly earnings in logging and
forest products were 144% of the provincial average for all industries).  As the old growth
BC forest industry reaches and surpasses maturity, then unless there is adequate
diversification into value-added products or alternative income sources, its rural forestry
communities reliant on export led growth will themselves become increasingly vulnerable.
The pit villages of the UK coal mining industry testify to the likely consequences.  Indeed, a
situation similar to this has already been reached in a number of the coastal forestry
communities in the province.
Social and environmental resource values are enhanced as the economic scarcity of the
resource base increases.  Provided some mechanism is developed to allow such values to be
incorporated in the land use and resource management system, this offers a number of BCs
rural communities an alternative developmental lifeline, through diversification into tourism,
leisure and recreational pursuits.  Given the public ownership of the provincial land base, BC
should been in an advantageous position to promote such strategies.  However, it still remains
true that the cash nexus predominates and that markets fall far short of reflecting the true
economic value attached to these alternative resource uses.  The starkest contrast can be seen
6in the attempts to reconcile resource based commercial interests and traditional values in the
settlement of First Nations land claims (see below).
The remainder of this paper draws on the above analysis of the consequences of the current
development pathway facing rural BC communities to examine some of the key elements of
what we have termed a demonstration project undertaken by the provincial administration
during the tenure in office of the New Democratic Party (NDP) between 1991 and 2001 to
move towards a new, more sustainable pathway.  Their record in this respect can be seen as a
test of the feasibility of promoting community-based sustainability promoted for an economy
with a  completely open export dependent resource base.  The efforts of this radical
administration were described by one cabinet minister as an attempt to deliver sustainability
in one province (Milke, 2001, pp.9-10).  Our paper tests the inherent viability of this
experiment by considering the achievements in four of its key elements:
• establishment of a consensual locally-based strategic land use planning and
management system;
• reform of the forestry resource base through new codified publicly accountable
management processes;
• agreement on settlement of First Nation land claims and the devolution of resource
planning and management to these new self-governing territories;
• design of a community-based consensual process to examine the moratorium on
offshore oil developments.
Strategic land use planning
The post-war history of BC is replete with examples of local community interests being
forfeited in pursuit of broader provincial development goals.  Many examples of this can be
found in the forestry sector.   Forestry was the source of a major political scandal in the 1950s
involving the bribing of a provincial government minister for timber licences (OKeefe &
Macdonald, 1999), and continues to be the focus for ongoing disputes between forestry
interests and environmentalists (see for example: Drushka et al, 1993; Parfitt B 1998;
Drushka, 1999).
Of even more pervasive impact in terms both of local rural communities, including First
Nations, and their local ecology, have been the hydro-electric projects tied initially into major
resource based projects at Kitimat (Christensen, 1995) and the Peace River (Pollon &
Matheson, 1989), but nowadays equally important as a source of export earnings from energy
sales to the United States.  As Toller & Nemetz (1997) observe when arguing for greater
local involvement in the land use planning process:
While the concept of sustainability suggests that resource use decision-making should
attempt to balance demands on environmental, social, and economic systems, the application
of this concept is particularly challenging when the greatest benefits of hydro development 
those related to increased power generation  are decided in and received by communities
hundreds of kilometres away in the Lower Mainland of BC and the US Pacific Northwest
(p.5).
The NDP was elected as the provincial government in 1991 on a platform promising the
resolution of such disputes.  Termed Peace in the Woods, their platform promised to bring
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zoning of BC land based resources.  The previous Social Credit administrations, which
dominated provincial politics for forty years from 1951, promoted rapid development of BCs
natural resource base through large scale commercial development, as a means of boosting
provincial revenues, opening up the rural hinterland and generating non-metropolitan
employment.
An important consequence of the approach inherited by the NDP was the establishment of
major integrated saw, pulp and paper mills in the northern provincial interior during the
1970s.   These were locked into the export market and most eventually came to be owned by
non-provincial multinational companies.  Rapid boosts in the annual allowable cut on
Crown Lands to fund this strategy came under serious attack by home-based environmental
movements such as Greenpeace during the 1970s and 1980s.  These activists focused their
campaigns on the most vulnerable aspect of BCs resource based development strategy: the
international customers for the provinces wood products.
The newly elected NDP administration sought ways to placate environmental criticisms and
to introduce more participatory ways of determining the extent to which Crown lands should
be used for development purposes.  One part of this approach was a Protected Areas Strategy
(PAS), delivering a promise to double the area under protective conservation in the province,
from 6% to 12% of the land base.  This was to be achieved through a new system of
consensual locally-based land use plans, that would itself also provide the basis for a more
sustainable management of resource based developments.
After an initial attempt to delegate the task to an arms-length agency, the Commission on
Resources and the Environment (CORE), which proved of limited effectiveness in generating
plans acceptable across the spectrum of rural interests, a co-ordinating office in the provincial
administration was established to bring together the interests of the various provincial
ministries and to drive through consensus reached via regional planning tables.  By the start
of 2001, the Land Use Coordinating Office (LUCO) had a set of Land and Resource
Management Plans (LRMPs) in various stages of completion, which covered most of the
province (LUCO, 2001).
In essence, the LUCO approach seeks to divide up the publicly owned provincial land base
into zones for intensive development, zones for conservation, and intermediate areas where
development can only proceed with respect to non-resource values, and in ways which
minimise the impact on these other values.  The planning process links inter-agency
ministerial planning mechanisms into a strong locally-based citizen advisory structure, with
regional tables providing the means to shape their own discussion and consultative processes
(Jackson & Wood, 1999).
Although feedback from this process has revealed a mixture of opinions as to its
effectiveness, the central point of the exercise is that it places local rural communities back at
the heart of determining appropriate uses of their local land base, rather than delegating this
to a distant provincial bureaucracy which has seen its development role in the past as
negotiating directly with big business.  As Jackson & Curry (forthcoming) have argued, the
real test of this approach will be whether it survives the recent defeat of the NDP and the
assumption of office by a new administration more sympathetic to forest industry interests.
These interests include many of the rural municipalities, which continue to regard a healthy
forest industry as the best means of safeguarding their futures.  There is considerable scope
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the intermediately zoned resource areas, and a number of conferences have been held on
ways in which to establish a provincial monitoring framework and procedures to this end
(LUCO, 1999; LUCO, 2000).
Forestry Practices
Given the degree of dependency and vulnerability experienced by many of the rural
communities which are reliant on the forestry sector, it was evident from the outset that the
new strategic land use planning system introduced to BC during the 1990s had to be closely
tied into the management of the 96% of BC forest resources which are on Crown lands.  The
approach adopted by the NDP administration to deliver this element of community-based
sustainability was mired in controversy.
Part of the source of the problem that beset the administration can be traced to a longstanding
ban on the export of logs cut on public lands.  Adding together softwood logs and lumber,
sales of logs from BC in 1999 accounted for only 3.2% of the total value of exports,
compared with 55.1% for the US (BC Stats, 2000a).  The ban on log exports is designed to
ensure a plentiful supply of timber for provincial mills, and to support employment in these
mills.  It also ensures that logs are sold to the BC wood processing sector at prices well below
world levels.
The cost of such a strategy to the BC provincial government is considerable, both in terms of
lost revenue and the resulting complications created for its external trading relationships.  In
effect, the embargo represents a hidden transfer from provincial government revenues in
terms of foregone stumpage fees and royalties to the provincial forest industry.  In a
calculation based on 1993 pricing differentials for stumpage fees on freely exportable logs
compared with those sold in the province, Drushka (1999) estimated that the loss for that year
alone amounted to $Can2.5 billion.  This is equivalent to $35, 000 for each of the 70,000
workers directly employed in the sector.  Drushka observes that:
by transferring wealth to the mills, large urban centres end up being developed at the
expense of rural areas.  This process is most obvious on the BC coast, where more than a
century of logging and manufacturing has left rural areas relatively devoid of infrastructure
(ibid., p.183).
Because of the closed market for logs in BC, mills on either side of the BC/US border face
very different raw material costs.  The high proportion of felled American timber sold as logs
on world markets ensures that American mills have to pay world market prices for their
supplies.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the US Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports pressed the
US government for protection from what they claimed was unfair competition from
subsidised Canadian mills.
Faced with the prospect of large import duties on sales of lumber to the US, the NDP
responded by hiking stumpage fees in 1994, undertaking to recycle the resulting revenues
from Super Stumpage back to the industry in the form of increased silviculture expenditure
and related job creation, through a development agency created for this purpose: Forest
Resources BC (FRBC).  Shortly afterwards Canada as a whole began to negotiate a five year
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expires agreement limited unregulated sales to the American market to an overall annual
quota of 14.7 billion board feet, triggering an escalating export duty on sales in excess of this.
As Figure 4 indicates, one of the effects of attempts to maintain exports of lumber products
while continuing to embargo those of logs was a rapid growth in provincial revenues from
Crown forests.  In nominal terms, between 1986 and 1998 total revenue rose more than
eightfold, despite the slump from 1995 onwards.  Revenue per cubic metre of cut timber rose
even more, showing a tenfold increase over the same period, because the total cut during this
time steadily fell.
The large boost in provincial revenues from the forest sector came as an embarrassment to
the provincial government, since it coincided with NDP efforts to impose tighter and more
environmentally sound management practices on the industry.  Forest industry interests were
able to claim that additional regulations combined with higher charges had undermined their
competitive position in world markets.  A KPMG study commissioned by the provincial
government and reported in Cashore et al (2001, pp.78-79) revealed that delivered wood
costs rose 75% over a four year period from $Can50 per cubic metre in 1992 to $Can87 in
1996.  45% of this rise could be attributed to stumpage increases and 33% to the costs
associated with introducing a new Forest Practices Code, with the remaining 22% assigned to
non-Code-related cost drivers.
The Forest Practices Code enacted in 1994 was central to efforts by the NDP to deliver
peace in the woods and was intended to complement the new consensual locally-based
approach to strategic land use planning discussed in the previous section.  Hitherto, the
provinces Ministry of Forests had allocated licences and leases, determined the allowable cut
on these, and supervised the harvesting of timber by tenure holders, in a process that
excluded public participation.
Part of the intention behind the new Code was to open up the debate on forest resources to
local interest groups and stakeholders, and to create a management structure that would allow
the non-timber values and uses of the provinces public forests to be better represented and
safeguarded.  There was also a pressing need to bring together the myriad of different
licenses and leases under a common standard, as much to help the forest industry itself in
determining whether fellings were within the capacity of the forests, and to offer them some
greater degree of security of tenure to encourage better silviculture measures, and to reduce
the amount of land classified as not satisfactorily restocked.  To the extent that secondary
growth could be boosted to replace primary forests taken out of the operable land base for
forestry, this would cushion reductions in overall AACs resulting from the PAS and new
strategic land use planning system.
The Forest Practices Code relates to the actual management of forest reserves and the
harvesting of timber.  This is distinct from, but closely related to, the determination of the
annual cut.  Under the 1991 revisions to the Forest Act the determination of capacity for
harvesting has been made a far more transparent process, involving the publication of
technical reports and socio-economic assessments along with public consultations.  A
separate assessment for each Timber Supply Area or Tree Farm Licence has to be undertaken
on a quinquennial basis, and the intention is to incorporate the results into the LRMPs for the
relevant forest regions.
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To complement the new process of setting AACs, the 1994 Forest Practices Code introduced
a highly detailed set of operational plans designed to deliver tighter environmental constraints
on felling.  It codified management practices, transformed guidelines into mandatory
regulations, and set up a new enforcement regime.  All this, however, was at the expense of a
complex additional layer of bureaucracy, including the addition of a Forest Practices Board to
oversee the administration of the Code, together with an appeals commission.
As originally conceived, the Code provided for six operational plans, with the other five plans
driven by a quinquennial Forest Development Plan setting out all the proposed management
activities for the area.  The forty three district managers of the Ministry of Forests were
responsible for approving all these operational plans.  The Code included new legal limits on
the maximum clearcut area, buffer strips for coastline and fish bearing streams, and so on.
Implementation of the Code started in June 1995, with the intention to provide a two year
period for full compliance.  This intention proved impossible to realise.  In part, this was
because of the delays in implementing the new strategic land use planning system into which
the Code was meant to dovetail.  In addition, by 1996 the forest industry was experiencing a
cyclical downturn in pulp prices, the new SLA had just come into effect, and South East
Asian markets had collapsed.  With the prospect substantial redundancies in the sector, the
NDP provincial government focuses its attention on ways to simplify the Code and to reduce
its administrative burden.
The 1997 Forest Statutes Amendment Act reduced the number of operational plans required
by the Code from six to three and signalled a move towards a results-based system of
management.  This move attracted criticism from environmental pressure groups as a
retrenchment, but it is difficult to see how the original complex proposals would have
provided a lasting management structure.  By the end of the decade, the administration had
managed to deliver a more formalised structure for administering public forests.  By making
the planning and management processes more transparent and publicly accountable, this had
succeeded in stimulating greater public engagement, debate and participation in the
management of public forests.  In addition, the provincial bureaucracy was better placed to
supervise its tenure holders, assisted by a new supervisory board to watch over
implementation of the Code and an appeals commission to which recourse is possible in the
event of fundamental disagreements.
Whether a provincial bureaucracy offers the best means of delivering a more sustainable,
consensual and locally-based system of managing BCs principal natural resource remains an
open question.  The Forest Practices Code is redolent of the traditional command and control
approach to environmental regulation.  The newly created development agency for the sector,
FRBC, has not made a lasting impact.  The actual impact of the Code on key variables such
as clearcut size is debatable.  As Figure 5 demonstrates, the average size of a clearcut block
was falling before the Code began to be implemented and has since shown little change.  The
opportunity to consider new market based instruments for delivering sustainability at lower
cost, such as a revision to tenure arrangements, has been largely overlooked.  Given the
limited success of public sector intervention and a recognition that environmental pressures
will not disappear, the forest industry has started to consider initiatives that are within its own
power to deliver.
One of the more significant developments is the gradual acceptance by the BC forestry sector
of voluntary environmental standards, as a way of proving its sustainability credentials to its
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environmentally conscious export markets.  In addition to the International Standards
Organisation, which is only a minor actor in this process, two further certification agencies
have made an impact in the sector: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Canadian
Standards Association (CSA).
FSC includes within its principles an assumption against logging primary forests, which
makes this standard unpalatable in its present form to the provincial forest industry.  Efforts
are underway to soften this interpretation in ways acceptable to the forest sector, but as yet no
major BC forest operation has succeeded in receiving FSC certification.  By contrast, the
CSAs Sustainable Forest Management System was developed by the Canadian forest
industry itself, and is explicitly designed to meet Canadian industry needs.  As a result, it is
viewed with scepticism by environmental pressure groups.  Even so, it was not until April
1999 that the first forest operator in BC receive CSA certification.
Whichever standard finds most favour in BC, few current environmental management codes
and systems provide an opportunity for public debate on the performance of the certified
operator.  Only those such as the European Union Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
explicitly require adherence to the principles of sustainable development and the publication
of reports.  It is therefore questionable whether this route can provide an effective means of
promoting community-based sustainable development in the management of the provinces
publicly owned forests.
First Nations
Canadas 1996 Population Census revealed that one-in-six Canadians identifying themselves
as aboriginals (North American Indian, Metis or Inuit) lived in BC (BC Stats, 1998).   Overall
numbers in this category for BC amounted to just under 140,000, and made up 3.8% of the
provincial population.  Approximately 40% of the North American Indian population in the
province still lives on reserves, so the First Nations make up a proportionately much higher
share of the remote rural communities in BC.
Unlike the rest of the country, most of the province was first settled by colonists without the
benefit of treaties with native tribes.  When the province entered the confederation in 1871,
the federal government assumed that Native Title to lands in the province continued to exist
and that treaties would be required to extinguish this.  The matter remained unresolved for a
century, until a succession of decisions by the Canadian Supreme Court confirmed the federal
governments position, and the provinces own Court of Appeal ruled in favour of First
Nations land claims.
One of the first acts of the newly elected NDP administration in 1991 was to adopt proposals
for a Treaty Commission to settle First Nations land claims in the province.  Settlement of
such claims could be seen as adding to the impact of the Protected Areas Strategy in reducing
the land base available for commercial exploitation of natural resources, since the interim
agreements and any ensuing Treaties would remove land from provincial control and vest it
in the collective ownership of a First Nation.  Similarly, First Nation claims would need to be
taken into account when developing consensual locally based strategic land use plans.
Over the subsequent decade, 47 of the provinces First Nations, representing about 70% of
the aboriginal population, entered claims with the Treaty Commission.  Negotiation of
settlement of these claims involves large cash sums, most of which the federal government
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will meet, as well as land reallocation.  Cashore et al (2001, p.130) estimate that in the final
settlement the total area under First Nations outright ownership should be between 24,000
and 29,000 square kilometres of mostly rural land, amounting to around 3% of existing
Crown lands.  This would include some 5% of the provincial forest base, providing 3.45
million cubic metres of timber.
Compensation is due to existing licence holders of Crown forests for any losses which would
result, in the same way that the province is liable for loss of licences on land included in the
PAS.  Overall, therefore, pursuit of this policy by the NDP has not only been politically
highly sensitive and divisive in many of the affected areas.  It has also entailed an additional
major financial commitment towards social inclusion and subsidiarity, together with a further
depletion of the commercial resource base available to the provincial government.
The initial final settlement Treaty was signed in 1998 with the Nisgaa First Nation of the
Upper Nass Valley, whose reserves to the north of Terrace amongst the coastal forests were
combined into a self-governing territory of 5, 500 people covering 450 square kilometres.
This territory includes an AAC of 150,000 cubic metres, or around 7% of the total AAC in
the local TSA.  Under the Treaty, the Nisgaa First Nation collectively now owns all forest
resources in its territory and acquires exclusive authority to determine, collect and administer
all fees, rents, royalties or other charges in respect of timber resources in this area, and to
make laws governing the management of its timber resources.
Full local self-government based on a Treaty settling land claims accords First Nations far
greater opportunity than is currently available to any other local rural community in the
province to pursue an integrated system of sustainable resource management and
development based on the preservation of eco-system integrity.  It is instructive to consider
whether these new self-governing small communities will have the capacity and motivation
to realise such opportunities and to develop appropriate land management systems.  To date,
the record of the Nisgaa in this respect is impressive.  An amusing illustration of the
preparations made for self-government by the Nisgaa First Nation is provided in a story
retold in Pearse (1994), relating to several years prior to the final Treaty.
As part of the pre-Treaty negotiations over their land claims, tribal representatives attended a
meeting with provincial government officials in Victoria, giving a two hour presentation of
their case using a sophisticated GIS package, presented through a lap-top pc and projector.
The provincial government official responding had to make do with less sophisticated tools:
a rather beleaguered individual made his way to the wall, and tied up a single, hand-drafted
map for discussion.  The contradiction was powerful, and its significance was not lost on the
participants of the meeting.  Probably for the first time in Canada, a local government, and in
this case an aboriginal one, had challenged centralised government agency in the
information game and had come out on top (ibid., p.112).
Those fortunate to visit the new legislative building which houses the advanced technology
underpinning the Nisgaa land use management plans nowadays will have little difficulty in
appreciating this contrast to the full.  Since 1979, the Nisgaa tribal council has made a
concerted effort to enhance its capacity to manage its land and resource base by applying the
most advanced techniques available.  In 1986 the tribal council developed an extensively
documented proposal for a Tree Farm Licence based on ecologically integrated land use
principles; in 1990 they created a fully fledged GIS on to which all the relevant resource data
13
has been transferred; in 1991 they installed a satellite imaging process and acquire a Landsat
imaging facility integrated into their GIS; and, since 1992, they have developed large scale
spatial resource databases, using a GIS resource mapping system to create 24 management
units covering its entire traditional territory.
The use of such technology is tied into an attitude towards resource management that is far
removed from the dependency on export led development common to most other rural BC
communities.  It reflects several thousand years human activity on the northwest coast
corresponding in scale and style of land use to what we define today as an ecological
approach the result of a structured system of land tenure and resource management that had
evolved functionally over time to allow a sustained and flourishing collective economic
livelihood (ibid., p.115).
The traditional First Nations tribal territories are delineated in terms of watersheds, owned
collectively by a Nisgaa matrilineal unit, in which a chief allocating resources and makes
management decisions on behalf of the unit.  The management unit by its nature has an
inbuilt feedback on the sustainability of the watershed resources available to the tribe.   There
are moral constraints on over-harvesting and wastage.  Traditional knowledge is passed on by
word of mouth about such capacity constraints from generation to generation, and regarded as
part of the collective wisdom of the tribe (Nisgaa Tribal Council, 1993).
The model offered by the First Nations bears the closest resemblance to the eco-forestry
alternative to current commercial development of BC resources favoured by a number of
local commentators.  Burde et al (1998) observe that if the values associated with natural
forests are to be sustained, then the finite nature and immense non-timber value of forest
ecosystems must be recognised (p.46).  Pearse (1994) suggests that the realisation of land
claims offers unsurpassed opportunities to create a meaningful place for proper ecological
planning in the development of BC (p.113).
North of the provincial border, the Federal Territories of the Yukon and the North West
Territories have embarked on parallel initiatives, involving a tri-partite set of agreements
between the federal, territorial and First Nations administrations, and embodied in similar
treaties.  In some respects, these agreements go further than the settlements hitherto reached
in BC.  The Yukon has seen the establishment of a Regional Land Use Planning Commission
in the north, and is in the process of creating another for the southern region of Teslin
(YLUPC, 2000):
The Final Agreement is a set of provisions that acknowledges aboriginal inherent rights to
the land.  However, it also creates a land-based structure of governance that defines
management processes and makes the link between how humans use the land, and how they
interact with one another.  This link is the guiding principle for the model set up in the Land
Claim Agreement (p.2).
In the North West Territory, the Gwichin Settlement Area has developed a land use plan
(GLUPB, 1999) under the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management (1998) Act, which
incorporates the Gwichin Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement along with earlier
agreements with the Sahtu Dene and Metis.  These arrangements establish both land use
planning boards to establish zones for development and land and water boards to manage the
resources accordingly, together with an environmental impact review board.  The land use
planning process under the 1998 Act requires that:
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• special attention shall be devoted to the rights of First Nations under the land
claim agreements, to protecting and promoting their social, cultural and economic
well-being, and to the lands used by them for wildlife harvesting and other
resource uses; and
• land use policy must involve the participation of the First Nations and of residents
and communities in the settlement area.
The basic structure of the Gwichin Land Use Plan is very similar to that developed under the
BC Strategic Land Use Planning system.  Three zones are identified, each with a different
degree of freedom for commercial resource development.  In the areas zoned as protected,
which cover 10% of the total settlement area, there is an embargo on oil and gas
development, mining, sand gravel and rock extraction, transportation, waste disposal,
communication, power development, and commercial renewable resource activities.  In the
special management zones, covering 33% of the settlement area, all land uses compatible
with conditions outlined in the Plan (drafted to address local concerns and the local
environment) are permitted as long as necessary approvals are obtained.  Finally, in areas
zoned for general use, covering the remaining 57% of the settlement area, all land uses are
possible with the necessary approvals from the current regulatory system.
Offshore Debates
The Northern Development Commission (NDC) was established in 1998 under the Northern
Development Act to promote job creation and economic development and to attract
investment to northern BC.  Its Commissioner runs an office in Prince George staffed by a
small team, and has sufficient funding to offer pump-priming assistance to development
initiatives.  The Commissioner reports directly to Ministers in the provincial government.
In 1999, the Commissioner set in motion a project to design a community based consensus
building consultative process for examining a central issue affecting the future development
of the coastal and northwestern parts of northern BC: the lifting of a moratorium on offshore
oil and gas developments.  The decline in the local fishing industry and failure to attract other
activities to the area had created a lobby in 1997 (the North Coast Oil and Gas Task Force) to
press for a re-examination of the moratorium.  In turn, this prompted the creation in 1999 of a
BC Alliance for the Preservation of the Moratorium on Offshore Oil and Gas, embracing a
coaltion of environmental, fishing and First Nations Groups.
The response taken to this planning issue is innovative.  Rather than reliance on a public
inquiry to impose a formalised legalistic set of adversarial hearings which would have
difficulty in engaging the many scattered local communities and stakeholders across the large
area affected, or a Royal Commission to consult local views and take evidence, the NDC has
funded a design team of local stakeholders to recommend a process intended to ensure
genuine local involvement and consultation in the examination of the issue.
The moratorium was imposed in 1987, as the culmination of a series of disputes between
federal and provincial jurisdictions on ownership of offshore coastal water rights.  The first
Order-in-Council asserting provincial authority issued in 1959 was in response to federal
authorisation of offshore drilling off the west coast of Vancouver Island and the Hecate
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Strait.  During the 1980s increasing pressure on energy supplies saw the federal government
increasing incentives for development of offshore reserves and more BC Orders-in-Council
reasserting provincial claims.
In 1983 a memorandum of understanding was signed by the two jurisdictions, to establish a
review process to assess the environmental and socio-economic impacts of offshore
exploration and development, which led to the creation of the West Coast Environmental
Assessment Panel.  In 1986 this reported that subject to a large number of conditions
exploration could proceed.  The report was accepted by both jurisdictions and negotiations
began on the management of such development, including the division of anticipated tax
revenues, a process termed the Pacific Accord.  However, in the aftermath of major
environmental damage from a number of oil spillage incidents along the American part of the
Pacific coastline, including the Exxon Valdez incident, the provincial government imposed a
unilateral moratorium in 1987, and the federal government withdrew from the accord.
In his report to the relevant provincial Ministers recommending acceptance of the design
team report, the Commissioner observed that:
the people of Northwestern and Coastal communities, through their interviews with The
Conflict managers Group and the work of the Process design Team, have given all of us a
clear and consistent message: they want an opportunity to meet, discuss, listen reflect and
decide if it is in the best interests of their community to lift the moratorium or not and, if so,
on what terms.   They want to make their decision on the basis of reliable information they
can trust (Backhouse, 2001, p.10).
The design team was selected in a process which advertised for volunteers from local
stakeholders, resulting in 27 members drawn from First Nations, local municipalities, fishing
interests, business, environmentalists, academics and ordinary members of the public.  This
was guided by consultants experienced in consensual approaches, and by a small staff from
the NDC.  The Commissioner clearly regards the process model and code of principles
produced as a demonstration of the validity of this approach, calling it an exciting example
of how to develop an effective capacity for community decision making.  It is a model that
can be applied elsewhere in the province to debate controversial public policy issues in a
respectful, yet focused, way (ibid., p.5).
The process of public examination and consultation will consist of a series of some fifteen
public meetings in affected local communities in the area held in conformance with the
design team template, supported by four main events in the major centres.  The whole process
is planned to last nine months, with the final report to be presented in the spring of 2002.  The
design team agreed certain basic principles governing the approach to be adopted in the
examination process, which was to be:
• informative
• respectful
• balanced
• interactive
• accessible
• relevant to the communities
• reflective of the actual experiences of other communities.
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To assist in this respect, a major database with reports and other documentation on offshore
oil developments has been established at the University of Northern British Columbia in
Prince George, and is accessible via the internet.
Consensus is a difficult objective to deliver, when there are strongly held and divergent views
amongst the remote communities affected, many of which display the classic symptoms of
the vulnerability common to peripheral export led local economies.  During the initial
discussions of the process design team, agreement was reached on the approach to be taken in
attaining consensus.  The minutes of the first meeting set this out:
The group agreed to use the method of having the Chair ask the question Is there anyone
who cannot live with the decision.  If an appropriate amount of time has passed and no
comment is made, then the Chair will pronounce that the group has reached consensus and
the decision is made.  The Chair would have the ability to allow further discussion if there is
a concern raised about whether the issue has been thoroughly debated and if the concern still
exits ask the individuals what the issues are that are preventing consensus from being
reached (ibid., Appendix C, Minutes of Meeting of 15 February 2001).
Conclusions: Sustainability in One Province?
In examining the various approaches adopted by the NDP during its decade in charge of the
province, the examples used have been chosen to illustrate the range of issues and
instruments applied over this period by the administration to tackle the pressing land use
development problems facing BCs rural communities.  The common theme underlying these
examples has been the pursuit by a radical provincial administration of ways to take the
planning and management of publicly owned land based resources back to the people, and to
distance it from the corporatist approach developed under the previous administration, which
excluded local public involvement in favour of decision making by a caucus of provincial
bureaucrats and business people.
The overall record of the NDP in this respect has been patchy.  Although there is much to
admire in terms of initiatives taken, too often these have been allowed to wither when
circumstances determine a change of political priorities.  Addressing an audience at Simon
Fraser University in Burnaby in 1998, an NDP cabinet minister applied a surprising analogy
in offering his assessment of NDP achievements.  Comparing NDP efforts to deliver a radical
agenda to those of the Soviet regime after it failed to spread its creed internationally and had
to focus on socialism in one country with all the repressive abuses attached to this, the
minister went on to argue:
My thesis is that the environmental movement has inherited both the vitality and the
weakness of the last great human experiment and, even at the moment of capturing the
worlds attention, given up on organising the world in favour of trying to impose and defend
sustainability in one culture, one province, one community.  Pretty much for the same
reasons I think sustainability in one province wont work, and a broader objective might
(quoted in Milke, 2001, pp.9-10).
Although the sentiment is appealing, the analogy offered is fundamentally false.  What failed
in the Soviet experiment was a commitment to democratic accountability.  In NDP attempts
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to deliver sustainability in one province over the 1990s, what has been found wanting is a
continued belief in the efficacy of bureaucratic interventionism.  As our paper indicates, there
is much in the record to applaud, but the most lasting achievements are not likely to be found
in the convoluted attempts to impose resource management regimes from top down on local
managers and communities.  Instead, the areas of enduring success will be those initiatives
designed to promote genuine locally based consensual agreements on the zoning and
management of land use resources, such as the First Nations settlements, aspects of the new
strategic land use system, and in the design process initiated to examine the offshore
moratorium.
Based on the above analysis, our contention is that delivery of sustainable development
amongst peripheral export led rural communities in BC requires the means to deliver genuine
local commitment in land use planning and resource management.  Too little has been
achieved under the NDP administration to lift the hand of centralised bureaucracy from local
communities, in ways that foster an engaged consensual dialogue across all stakeholders.  In
terms of real decision-making power, much of the impetus behind the NDP approach towards
sustainability has been dirigiste rather than participatory: engaging the public in a debate
which is ultimately still resolved in Victoria rather than inviting local communities to assume
responsibility for their own sustainable future.
The examples of the Land and Resource Management process, the experience of the Nisgaa
First Nation assumption of self-government, and the Process Design Team on the offshore
moratorium demonstrate the capacity of BC communities to respond to participatory
opportunities and devolved responsibility.  Unless the NDPs successors can find ways to
promote more such processes of subsidiarity, the rural communities of BC will be continue to
be frustrated in their attempts to think globally, but act locally, regardless of whether it
proves possible to envisage sustainability in one province.
Text length: 8,500 words
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Figure 1: Dominant basic sectors in non-metropolitan BC communities in 1996 by
region  Source: Horne, 1999
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Figure 2: Variations in economic diversity between non-metropolitan BC communities
in 1996 by regions  Source: Horne, 1999
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Figure 3: Vulnerability of non-metropolitan BC communities to fluctuations in income
from forestry activities in 1996 by regions  Source: Horne, 1999
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Figure 4: Revenue from BC Crown Forests 1986-1998 Source: Drushka,1999
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Figure 5: Average cutblock size on BC Crown Forests  Source: MoF, 2000
